Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Arsenal and Problems Essays

Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Arsenal and Problems Essays Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Arsenal and Problems Essay Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Policies, Arsenal and Problems Essay Essay Topic: We Real Cool The end of the Cold War signaled conclusion of the nuclear rivalry between the then two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This was a propitious event for global security. Many predicted this to be the end of history. While there was relative peace for a decade or so, there has been unending debate over recession of the threat of nuclear war. While commonly the United States and the Western Allies have been regarded as more responsible possessors of nuclear weapons, unfolding of Russian nuclear doctrine and policy provides greater confidence in exercise of responsibility by Moscow. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the successor state the Russian Federation with little choice but to follow Soviet-era policy in relation to nuclear weapons, but thought was given to revising strategies to meet the new and emerging threats. Basically this meant pursuing deterrence strategy as a means of maintaining international order. This is important for both i nternal and external policy of the Russian Federation. Nuclear weapons give Russia the status it needs to be called a great power and for the Government of the day a sense of keeping a national security asset as an important goal post. A detailed analysis of Russian nuclear policy in the light of past experience, change of leadership in Russia post Cold War, current and possible future policy directions is thus essential.History of Nuclear Weapons PolicyAt the end of the Second World War, the US was the only nation in the world possessing nuclear weapons and they thought it could offset the superiority Soviet forces had in Europe. The US also thought the atomic bomb could be used as a political pressure point against Joseph Stalin to gain concessions in negotiations in the aftermath of the Second World War. But in August 1949 the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb, thus bringing to fore the philosophy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This was the main theory underlying the two superpowers quest to develop new nuclear weapons and delivery systems during the cold war. While the Soviet Union had the bomb it did not have the capability like the US to deliver these weapons to the chosen target. First aircraft and then intercontinental ballistic missiles became the chosen systems of delivery of nuclear weapons.Given the state of relations between the US and the USSR at the end of the war, it was natural that latter decided to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems to match that of the US. Of course, the Soviets lagged behind in technology and therefore could never really catch up. But for them the employment of nuclear weapons was for deterrence purposes. And this meant keeping forces ready for massive retaliation, should the US or its allies launch a first strike on Soviet soil.Cold War DimensionsDuring the Cold War the main aim of possessing nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear or massive conventional attack from the enemy from the other end of th e East-West divide. Throughout the Cold War, the main aim of the US was to contain the spread of communism. This was done at various levels military, political, economic and ideological. When Stalin died in 1953, there appeared to be a chance that a cooling down of tempers would take place, but tensions increased again when Nikita Krushchev was removed from power. Through the Cold War, the US assumed that it had nuclear superiority. But this failed to prevent the Soviet Union from indulging in nuclear brinkmanship during the Berlin crisis in 1961 and in Cuba in 1962.In 1962 when the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted, both the US and USSR came to realize for the first time what dangers pre-emption could lead to. The Soviet Union had installed medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, following which the US President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade. After a period of tension, the Soviets backed down and removed the missiles. What this cold war experience brought home to both the supe rpowers was the risks involved in playing one-upmanship with nuclear weapons.The collapse of the USSR in 1991 ended the Cold War. This reduced tensions between the two superpowers. But both countries still had a large nuclear arsenal in their possession. Additionally, with the end of the Cold War, the US became more concerned with the development of nuclear weapons by nations other than the former Soviet Union.Post-Cold War SituationAs a result of the political and financial fall out of the collapse of the USSR, the armed forces and in particular the nuclear forces in the Russian Federation suffered greatly.   The armed forces were downsized three times their original size in the 1990s. So was Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This was because Moscow just did not have the resources to maintain a nuclear force of ten thousand warheads and about twenty thousand tactical nuclear weapons. There was another issue of concern; this was the risk of continuing to stockpiling nuclear artille ry projectiles which were likely to prove dangerous to maintain and prove to be hazardous to Russias own troops, if accidental detonations occurred.The phased reductions in the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s also coincided with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Republics to the territory of the Russian Federation. This process was accelerated by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and nuclear weapons from Central and Eastern Europe were moved to Russia.Changes in policies from Yeltsin to PutinThere is no doubt that despite the collapse of the USSR as a superpower, the Russian Federation still holds nuclear weapons in high esteem. In fact, nuclear weapons are still a major politico-psychological symbol of great power status for Russia. That is why it is often seen that Russian leaders repeatedly remind the international community, and in particular the US, that Russia is still a nuclear power. This gives both a feeling of Russia’s str ategic independence from the US and the domestic leadership is assured of a sense of importance in being able to have control over the nuclear button.The first post-1991 change in nuclear policy was introduced in the doctrine of 1993, which allowed the â€Å"first use† of nuclear weapons by Russia. Till then, official policy, allowed the use of nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack.As a result of the post-collapse phase the Russian government adopted a series of measures in relation to nuclear weapons, including reductions in the size of strategic nuclear forces. But the basic premise that the sole purpose of possessing nuclear weapons was to deter a large-scale attack did not change. President Boris Yeltsin signed two major policy documents, one in 1997 and the second in 1998, both of which provided for drastic cuts in the nuclear arsenal. This aimed at getting rid of nuclear tipped missiles’ as their planned service life expired and modernization progr ams were curtailed to suit the reductions in the armed forces. But the theoretical debate within the Russian military, about the enlargement of NATO had consequences as it once again brought back to centre stage the role of nuclear weapons and created the ground for demonstrations of usage of nuclear weapons in a much broader range of threat scenarios.Two important documents provide analysts with the framework to understand the global implications of Russia’s nuclear weapons doctrine. The first one is the one titled, â€Å"Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine†, which Boris Yeltsin approved in November 1993. Then in 2000, Vladimir Putin approved another Military Doctrine.In the Yeltsin document the role of nuclear weapons was defined as â€Å"the removal of the danger of a nuclear war by means of deterring [other states] from unleashing an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies† But keeping in mind the changes that had occurred in the post C old War war fighting scenarios, the doctrine, warned that even a limited war could become a global war. It also noted that even the limited use of nuclear weapons, say the use of tactical nuclear weapons, risked the outbreak of an all-out, nuclear war. The 1993 document did not spell out the right of â€Å"first use.† In fact there was no mention at all of the Cold War theory of ‘No-First-Use’ (Fedorov, 2002).The military doctrine of 2000 took the position that nuclear weapons were to be used for deterrence and not for aggression. The right to use nuclear weapons was reserved for retaliation against both conventional as well as nuclear aggression. Several things can be adduced from the 2000 document. (Fedorov, 2002). First, it has a clear geo-political message, implying a broader political role for Russia’s nuclear weapons. Second, Russia spelled out its willingness to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack.Additionally, like in the case of the US, Russia expressed a willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).   What the Putin document sought to really do was to broaden the conflict spectrum in which nuclear weapons could be used. Armed conflict, intra-state or inter-state; local or limited wars; regional conflicts; and global wars – all these are situations in which the use of nuclear weapons is envisaged.Nuclear weapons are associated with the last two postulates, but the threat of using them in the Russian context is also supposed to be prevalent to ensure that one type of war does not escalate to another. President Boris Yeltsin for example, explicitly referred to nuclear weapons during an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit in late 1999, to suggest that external forces should not get involved in the second war in Chechnya.Current and Future ProspectsThe 2003 â€Å"White Paper† of the Russian Federation postulates two missions for nuclear weapons: deterrence of an attack against Russia and de-escalation of a conflict in case deterrence fails. In contrast to the earlier document, the new guidance elaborates on these missions in considerable detail. (Sokov, 2004)Given the experience of the Cold War, and post-1991 situation, the Russian Federation’s attitude towards the US, remains highly emotive. There are also complex interplays of geo-politics and domestic considerations, which govern Russian nuclear weapons policy in its relations with the US. The 2003 White Paper calls for a partnership with the US a â€Å"part of the solution† to the security problems afflicting the world. But at the same time it is argued that Russia (read its nuclear forces) are the only thing preventing the final destruction of international order as it currently stands. In fact the White Paper states that only the Russian armed forces can ensure global stability. (Sokov, 2004)What emerges from a study of the 2003 White Paper is that Russia wants to ensure that no force pressure and aggression is attempted against it or its allies. And, in case aggression of some sort does takes place, the new doctrine guarantees the defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of Russia. The 2003 White Paper gives an indication of how Russia will react to shifts in US nuclear weapons policy. It was projected by the White Paper that by 2007-2008, Russian Strategic Forces would consist of ten missile divisions. The 2003 document and subsequent remarks by Russian leaders provide an indication that Russia intends to keep its options open in preparing plans for the future of its nuclear triad.Another issue which will shape Russian nuclear policy in the years ahead is the ballistic missile shield planned by the United States in the close proximity of Russia in Czech Republic and other areas. The contours of this are not yet very clear, hence these cannot be c overed herein. However the debate has to be followed to enable understanding nuances of change that may ensue in Russian nuclear doctrine.ConclusionThe core of Russian nuclear weapons policy, i.e., nuclear deterrence, remains very much in place. It also determines the nature and state of Russia’s relations with the US, giving Moscow a measure of self-confidence. Nuclear weapons also remain underlying element of relations with China. Clearly, given past experience it is clear that Russia will determine the future shape of its nuclear policy depending on the developments that the US makes in developing more â€Å"usable† nuclear weapons. At the end of 2005, Russia still had around 7,200 active nuclear warheads and an estimated 8,800 inactive nuclear warheads. The state of the strategic forces that maintain these and are responsible for their delivery in case of a conflict is open to question. Additionally, issues of safety and security of these weapons, the nuclear weapo ns facilities and delivery systems continue to dog Russia. Still the very presence of these numbers of weapons on Russian soil sends a signal across the world.While international terrorism and non-proliferation are viewed as being important threats to Russia’s national security, the military in the Russian Federation still views US military capability as a threat and plans for it. This indicates a continuing vulnerability within the Russian establishment about its own capabilities. And that is why nuclear weapons are still on top the security agenda. In the second nuclear age, new uncertainties are emerging which will challenge the ingenuity of the Russian state as it attempts to handle the nuclear genie in all its manifestations.;